Sunday, December 18, 2011
Saturday, December 17, 2011
PARTITION
CYPRUS AND PARTITION: DIFFICULT BEDFELLOWS
William Mallinson
Introduction
Once more, Cyprus is on the international agenda, with the powers that be again telling the world that now is the last chance to solve the island’s problems, and the inherent threat that doom is the only alternative to agreement. That the island has been for hundreds of years a cat’s paw of competing outside powers, spitting out their fingernails of ambition onto the island, not always with happy results, is hardly open to dispute. Described by Henry Kissinger as a ‘staging-post’ and an ‘important piece of the world chequer-board’, Cyprus has for centuries been invaded, or passed from hand to hand, from English to French to Venetians to Ottoman Turks to Britain, and finally in 1960, in flawed form, to its own inhabitants, via a messy and divisive constitution. This constitution was based on positive discrimination, in favour of the Turkish Cypriots, and catered for the rights of outsiders, with almost three per cent of its territory going to Britain, along with associated rights. The treaties of 1960 that established the Republic of Cyprus were but an anachronistic extension of Britain’s colonial ethno-religious administration, dressed up in semantic sugar, but nevertheless a monkey on the back of the island’s mythical sovereignty. Few sane observers really believed that the 1960 constitution would work, particularly since the crucial question of communal boundaries in the big towns was not even agreed before independence. It took three years of bickering before the constitution collapsed in a spate of fighting and recrimination, which included the auto-ghettoisation of most of the Turkish Cypriots. Bizarrely, the collapse resulted from Foreign Office support for President Makarios’ suggested changes to the unworkable constitution. Eleven years later, following an Athens junta-inspired coup against President Makarios, Turkey invaded, and nearly all the Greek Cypriots were shoved south, becoming refugees in their own land. Even the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee wrote in 1987 that ‘the 1960 Constitution proved to be a cumbersome and frustrating instrument of government for all concerned’, while the Law Lords and Foreign Office legal advisors recognised that the Treaty of Guarantee conflicted with the UN Charter. Today the world is faced with the surrealistic situation of Turkey occupying part of the European Union, while trying itself to become a member. At present, the island’s fate seems to be divided between two main schools of thought, one partitionist, and the other integrationist. The present de facto partition looks like a historical anomaly, given that the inhabitants of the island, whether Greek-, Turkish-, Maronite- or Armenian Cypriot, had lived side by side, scattered throughout the island, for hundreds of years. Then the British came. Before demonstrating why separation is not the solution for Cyprus, and why we are at the present impasse, let us look at the phenomenon of partition itself.
The Expedient Panacea of Partition
The term ‘ partition’ is a fairly recent addition to the semantic baggage of international relations terminology, creeping into respectable academic and political language at the same as the term ‘geopolitics’ was making its Cold War comeback, along with political realism/power politics. This is no accident, since the imposition of artificial ‘business borders’ on weak areas of the world has increased exponentially since the Great War, and has been accompanied by various forms of partition. Perhaps the two most infamous cases of forced partition are those of India and Palestine, which have resulted in huge numbers of deaths.
Partition, it must be said, is a word with negative connotations, to the extent that it is often cloaked in different terminology. For its victims, it can conjure up images of apartheid, bantustanism, annexation, dismemberment, and even vivisection. For its advocates, it can serve as a convenient semantic panacea, a way of preventing people from fighting, or of liberating oppressed minorities in the name of ‘humanitarian intervention’, a term currently in vogue. Supporters of partition will rarely use the term straightforwardly, but latch onto words like ‘federation’, confederation’ and ‘zonality’, attached to words such as ‘pragmatic, or ‘realistic’. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines partition as ‘division into parts, especially political; of a country with separate areas of government’. The definition is perhaps of necessity vague, and as such could imply for some condominium, cantonisation, federalism and confederalism. At an extreme, and using perhaps an excess of logic, partition could even be construed as applying to the United States, since federal states could be seen as separate areas of government. But no outsiders forced the federal system on America. Another, but very different, case of unforced partition, is that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Conversely, following the last war, outsiders forced partition on Germany, but it lasted only as long as the post-war order did, essentially because it was artificial. It can be reasonably said that all manner of difficult situations are attached to the catch-all word ‘partition’, which has even become an expedient hegemonolinguistic panacea for annexation, secession, and civil war, apart from being possibly the lowest common denominator of international relations. The big debate is whether partition engenders strife, or vice-versa, or which is the chicken, and which the egg. In the case of Cyprus, unnatural division has been imposed on the island, which has in turn engendered creeping, and then enforced, de facto partition. To understand why, it is history that explains effectively, rather than the quagmire of competing IR theories.
Divide et Impera
When the British rented Cyprus from the Ottomans in 1878, to control Russian power in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to watch over ‘an unstable Analolia’, they found a peaceful society, albeit one in which the majority Greek-speaking Christians were second class citizens, as elsewhere in the crumbling Ottoman Empire. British even-handedness was therefore welcomed, as the ‘underdogs’ found themselves with the same rights as the Turkish-speaking Moslems. Christians no longer had to get off their donkeys when approaching a Moslem. As calls among the 82% majority for union with Greece grew, the British recognised that the Church of Cyprus (which the Ottomans, in line with their policy of non-interference in cultural and religious life, had allowed to thrive) needed to be cut down to size. Cyprus’ new masters interfered with education, which was jealously guarded by the Church, prompting some newspapers to compare British control unfavourably with that of the Ottomans, for all the latter’s despotism. In governing, the British also ensured that in the Legislative Council, British and the minority Moslem representatives could outvote the majority Christians. ‘Divide and rule’ had begun. When in 1931 a Moslem (who became known as the ‘thirteenth Greek’) voted with the Christians in a tax matter, London simply rescinded the vote, whereupon Government House was burnt down in mass rioting, and the colonial constitution was revoked. Owing to the then Greek leader, Venizelos’, policy of friendship towards Britain and Turkey, the union movement went underground, only to emerge with a vengeance towards the end of the war, with the UN-promoted pressure for self-determination, the impending return of India to the Indians (or at least most of it), the British pull-out from Palestine, and the return of the Dodecanese islands to Greece. Britain’s strategic obsessions in controlling the Middle East, and therefore Cyprus, in fear of the old Russian bugbear, put paid to any hope of freedom for the Cypriots. This was despite the fact that the Foreign Office had written that the Soviet Union had no interest in spreading communism in Greece, and despite Churchill’s agreement with Stalin that Greece would be 10% Russian and 90% English. There was even American and some high-level Foreign Office pressure to give Cyprus to Greece. Nevertheless, it was the Cold War and Colonial and Foreign Office hawks who won the day. The Greek government was initially nonplussed, and then angered, when the British refused even to discuss Cyprus. As pressure on Britain increased, the government turned to ‘divide and rule’ tactics. The British government worked secretly with Turkey, helping it with its propaganda. Hostilities broke out on 1 April 1955, and the following year, Britain called a conference of itself, Greece and Turkey, with the express aim of bringing in Turkey to an already complicated equation, in defiance of the Treaty of Lausanne, which forbade Turkey from having any responsibilities whatsoever in former Ottoman territories. The head of the Foreign Office called the conference to, in his own words, ‘seriously embarrass the Greek Government’ and to ‘define’ and ‘expose’ Greek and Turkish differences. As the Foreign Office predicted, the conference blew up almost at the start, and was followed by massive anti-Greek rioting in Turkey, and the end of not only Greek- and Turkish Cypriot friendship but, more ominously, the end of the correct Greek-Turkish relations that Venizelos and the Turkish leader, Ataturk, had established in 1930. Greek and Turkish relations have never recovered from the event, which was compounded when most of the remaining Greek citizens and Turkish citizens of Greek stock and religion were hounded out of Istanbul in 1964.
As the Greek Cypriots fought the British, pinning down up to thirty thousand soldiers, the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, was deported to the Seychelles, and Britain hired hundreds of auxiliary police, who, of course, happened to be Turkish Cypriot. It was mainly American pressure that forced the British to give way. The British, with the Greek and Turkish leaders of the time, came to an agreement, whereby Cyprus would gain independence, with no partition or union allowed. The Greek Cypriots were hardly allowed to participate, with Archbishop Makarios and a small team being allowed in towards the end of the negotiations. As we have seen above, the whole pack of cards collapsed in 1963.
Subtle Partition
By this time, and especially because of the Suez debâcle of 1956, Cyprus had assumed considerable importance for the USA, as well as Britain. Indeed, perhaps the main reason for Britain’s de facto annexation of two bits of the island in 1960 (Britain would, rather, claim that she had generously given most of Cyprus back) was the electronic intelligence-gathering facilities that had been moved to Cyprus. The age of Britain as one of the USA’s Middle East proxies had begun. Following the outbreak of violence in 1963, the Americans decided that the only solution to keep Cyprus from becoming too independent, and trying to reclaim the British territories, was partition. Thus, just as a hard-working British naval commander was bringing the Greek- and Turkish Cypriots together again, an American Assistant Secretary of State, George Ball, told him: ‘ Very impressive, but you’ve got it all wrong, son. Hasn’t anyone told you that our objective here is partition, not re-integration?’ The resulting Ball/Acheson plan was roundly rejected by Archbishop Makarios, since it would have meant the end of the republic, and quite possibly have led to more strife in the future, as has often happened with forced partition. But the Archbishop’s stance earned him the American government’s enmity, and the wholly incorrect epithet of the ‘Red Bishop’. Ever since then, partition has never been off the agenda.
Kissinger’s Partition
Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1967, and the return of around twelve thousand Greek troops to Greece, the writing was on the wall, as extremists in the US-supported Greek junta, and in Cyprus, did their utmost to get rid of Archbishop Makarios. It was the coup against Makarios, in July 1974, that gave Turkey the excuse it had been seeking to invoke Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, and intervene, ostensibly ‘to re-establish the state of affairs created by the present Treaty [of Guarantee]’. Britain’s refusal to honour its treaty obligations made it easier for the Turks to act with impunity. The fact that Kissinger (who by that time was running a one-man show in American foreign policy, as Watergate was coming to a head) did not denounce the coup, delayed recognising Makarios as the rightful leader, and did not call for the return to Greece of the Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard (and pressured the British not to), was extremely useful to the Turks, who thus had an excuse to intervene. They landed in Cyprus on 20 July. Far from re-establishing the previous state of affairs, the Turkish army began a creeping invasion, during frenetic negotiations in Geneva between the British, Turks and the new Greek government. The British Ambassador in Washington wrote that ‘the Turks could reasonably gamble that American disapproval would not be so forceful as to compel them to stop.’ To compound matters, when the Turks began their second, massive invasion and takeover of over one third of the island on 14 August, Kissinger refused to attend a NATO meeting before the 19th, thus affording the Turkish armed forces the time they needed to consolidate their occupation. The bandied-about Turkish justification for intervening was to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. This has however been shown to false, since the High Commission and the Commander of British forces in Cyprus made it plain that the Turkish Cypriots were in no danger, and that Turkey was simply seeking to invade. During the Geneva negotiations, Kissinger had already refused to see the new Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, even though the latter was prepared to come to Washington. It would obviously have made it difficult for the Turks to take over, while their chief overseas supporter was parleying with the Greeks. It is hardly surprising that Kissinger wrote later that the Cyprus problem was solved in 1974. One does not need to read the rumbustious and journalistic screeds of Christopher Hitchens to understand that Kissinger’s role was not honourable. The diplomatic documents of the supine Wilson government suffice to demonstrate this. Even as far back as 1971, a senior British diplomat had written: ‘It is impossible to square Kissinger’s expressed views with reality… it is rather his manner of conceiving foreign policy without reference to, or knowledge of, the State Department or anyone else which is most worrying. It leaves one with the fear that any day something could go seriously wrong because the normal sources of advice, restraint and executions are wholly by-passed.’ More tellingly, Kissinger said in 1974 that Cyprus was important in the Arab/Israel dispute, meaning that he considered the Britsh bases important to the defence of the Jewish State.
The Annan Scheme
Since the invasion and occupation, partition has never been off the agenda, only now the problem for those in favour of partition is more about how to legitimise the illegal and forced partition that exists, but using less cruel words. Just before he left the US Administration, Kissinger threw in his solution, which included the vague phrase; ‘the establishment of a federal system on a bizonal basis with relatively autonomous zones’. Makarios later bit the bullet, agreeing in early 1977, six months before his untimely death, to an ‘independent, non-aligned and bi-communal Cyporus’. But it made, and until now, has made no difference to Turkey’s aims of establishing a separate entity on Cyprus, through their forty thousand occupation troops and the importing of, at the last count, 160,000 illegal settlers, who now outnumber the dwindling (and slowly emigrating) original Turkish Cypriots by two to one.
The latest concerted attempt to subtly legalise the Turkish invasion a fortiori, prevent genuine integration, and ensure that Cyprus remains an object of external powers, without an independent foreign policy, was the so-called Annan Plan. The scheme was triggered by Cyprus’s impending membership of the European Union in 2004. With a member state occupied by an applicant, it would have been ridiculous to expect Cyprus, or indeed any member other than Britain, to support Turkey’s application. The first reason for the scheme’s introduction was that Cyprus’s EU membership posed a perceived threat to Anglo-American interests, which centre on the electronic intelligence gathering stations and Turkey having a strong strategic stake in Cyprus, particularly important given its (albeit currently shaky) military co-operation with Israel. Second, was the planned attack on Iraq, where the US and Britain needed to keep Turkey as sweet as they could. Third, was that by weakening the idea of an integrated state with a single independent foreign policy, and perpetuating institutional divisions, the scheme would keep Cyprus out of mainstream European security structures, since this would infuriate Turkey. This explains the flurry by Britain and the USA to sign with Turkey the so-called ‘Ankara Agreements’ in 2001, whereby it was agreed that Turkey would have a say in any putative ESDP operations in the Aegean and around Cyprus. The agreement was signed without EU authorisation, which annoyed Brussels, even if the ESDP only operates ‘when NATO is otherwise engaged’. An angry Greece then secured additions to the agreement whereby, somewhat farcically, it was agreed that no NATO member would threaten the use of, or use, force against another NATO member. In short, with US and British support, the Turkish military was using Cyprus to keep the EU out of the Eastern Aegean, and away from Greek islands which it periodically threatens with military overflights. Fourth, were Turkey’s membership aspirations per se. Had the plan been agreed, it would have smoothed Turkey’s path into the EU, and removed Greek Cypriot property claims from the ambit of European justice. The most blatant, yet curiously overlooked, evidence of this, was Britain and America’s persistent attempts to have Greece, Cyprus and Turkey (as well as Britain itself) sign a so-called ‘Foundation Agreement’ which, apart from perpetuating some of the most divisive aspects of the1960 treaties, entailed them agreeing a priori to support Turkey’s accession to the European Union. This was a complete infringement of sovereignty and would have weakened the EU’s very raison d’être.
Most bizarrely, the complete plan, of some ten thousand pages, was not put onto the UN website until one minute to midnight, on 23 April, the day before the referendum. It is hardly surprising that it was massively rejected by the Greek Cypriots, yet accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, but we shall never know the true vote of the latter, since the illegal settlers were allowed to vote. It has been said that even the occupation troops were allowed to vote, but I have not yet been able to verify this. If the plan had been accepted, it would have perpetuated the inherently unstable parts of the 1960 treaties, including the divisive aspects and the positive discrimination, which had been the institutional cause of the 1963 breakdown in the first place. By allowing a large proportion of illegal settlers to remain, further seeds of division would have been sown. Importantly, it would have weakened EU cohesion yet more than at present, by undermining EU law.
Then is Now
Guicciardini, considered the founder of modern historical research methods (i.e. recourse to original documents) wrote that things have always been the same, the past sheds light on the future, and that the same things return with different colours. Cyprus is a prime example of this. Just as Britain obtained it for strategic reasons, so the USA and Britain now need it for similar ones. Even if Britain did try to give up the bases following the invasion, and continued trying for at least three years afterwards, the USA simply said no, although a secret suggestion was made that the US would finance them, with discussions taking place. Today, British Middle East policy is part and parcel of America’s, and any attempt to relinquish its territories would be met with strong US resistance. The de facto partition continues, while Turkey continues to use the island as a hostage to gain entry to the EU, and advantages (political rather than legal) in the Aegean. The thought of two entirely independent states is unacceptable to the outside power-brokers, since a new international border would render the 1960 treaties, and therefore the bases, even shakier in terms of UN and EU law than they are at present. Better, they secretly say, to keep Cyprus as a de facto protectorate, but disguise this in a semantic overcoat, while maintaining the modus vivendi, to prevent all-out war between Greece and Turkey, which would weaken the NATO alliance to Russia’s benefit. In the sixties and seventies, the Foreign Office itself questioned the legality of the Treaty of Guarantee, admitted that the three treaties were interdependent, and wrote that anything which called the 1960 settlement as a whole into question could expose Britain to pressure to hang on to the bases, and that they would become increasingly anachronistic in world public opinion. It is these very treaties that have been a monkey on the back of the idea of a properly united island, where every inhabitant, of whatever persuasion, is protected by EU law, which would render the unnatural and forced separation untenable. It is clear that Cyprus has always been coveted by outside powers, and still is, whatever the lip service paid to self-determination. The case of Cyprus is interesting in that dissection came very late to the island, the result of outside interference, against the grain of its natural economic and cultural development over centuries. Extremist forces in Britain, Greece and Turkey caused radicalisation among extremist sections of the population, leading to the present impasse. It is often tempting to outside pundits to compare Cyprus to successful cases of division, such as the former Czechoslovakia, and then say, as the Turkish government does, that a Czech solution would work. This is ingeniously ingenuous (inadvertently or otherwise), however, since Turkey would not permit a new international Greece-friendly border so near to Turkey itself. Moreover, Czechoslovakia managed its divorce amicably, with very little outside interference. In the case of Cyprus, foreign interference, and particularly Turkish control over its occupied zone, would not permit the legal inhabitants themselves to work out their own destiny. Nor would they take kindly to an EU effort to enforce the acquis communautaire throughout the whole island, since this would threaten, from their point of view, their security. EU foreign policy cohesion is in any case virtually non-existent, one reason being the massive enlargement that has made decision-making so cumbersome, bedeviling a serious Common Foreign and Security Policy, as envisaged at Maastricht.
Conclusions
Although Cyprus and other cases of partition can be juxtaposed, actual comparison is difficult in detail. But some general lessons can be drawn. First is the fact that external involvement is often a factor. Former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, in particular, show us the danger of implanting alien populations in conquered territories, since they are themselves potential future seeds of partition, even generations later, usually because of externally influenced radicalisation. Kosovo is a case in point. Sri Lanka is an even more poignant example. During the colonial era, Britain brought in hundreds of thousands of Hindu Tamils to Buddhist Ceylon, with dreadful results generations later. Even Ireland cannot escape from a modicum of comparison, in that at around the same time as the Ottoman empire was settling Moslem Anatolians, and Janissaries, in Cyprus, so the English were settling radical Protestants in Roman Catholic Ireland. The partition of almost one hundred years ago did not solve the problem, and it is difficult to be certain that there will not be future strife, despite the enormous help of the USA, which has consistently pressured the British government behind the scenes to be more accommodating.
Cyprus’s fate can only be properly comprehended within the context of the interests of NATO, the EU, Turkey and Israel. As such, a clear-cut solution is a tough target. Too many people want a piece of the cake. A genuine federation, agreed in 1977, and confirmed in numerous UN resolutions since then is, at least theoretically, and hopefully in practice, the only viable basis for a solution. But it can only be achieved without the self-interested meddling of outside stakeholders, without reverting to outdated treaties that have proven to be the institutional worm in the apple. The EU, for its own self-respect, needs to adopt a more active position in the interests of all Cypriots, through its own soft power. Without this, Cyprus will continue to be a cat’s paw, rather than a fully-fledged sovereign state, a state in which Greek- and Turkish Cypriot alike would have the same individual rights as Moslems and Christians in the USA. Let us conclude by quoting from Galo Plaza’s 1965 report to the United Nations: ‘If the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction’.
William Mallinson, a former British diplomat, is Lecturer in British history, literature and culture at the Ionian University. He was awarded his doctorate, in international history, by the London School of Economics. He has numerous academic (and some media) publications. His books are: Public Lies and Private Truths: an Anatomy of Public Relations (Cassell, London, 1996 and Leader Books, Athens, 2000), Portrait of an Ambassador: the Life, Times and Writings of Themistocles Chrysanthopoulos (Attica Tradition Educational Foundation, Athens, 1998), Cyprus: a Modern History, published in Greek and English (I.B. Tauris, London and New York, Papazissis, Athens), Partition Through Foreign Aggression ( University of Minnesota, 2010), From Neutrality to Commitment: Dutch Foreign Policy, NATO and European Integration (I.B. Tauris, 2010); Cyprus: Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations (I.B.Tauris, 2010, and, in Greek, Estia, Athens, 2010); and Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since World War Two (I.B. Tauris, 2011) .
His speciality is archival research into post-World War Two diplomatic relations, with particular reference to Anglo-Greek-US relations, and European defence policy.
William Mallinson
Introduction
Once more, Cyprus is on the international agenda, with the powers that be again telling the world that now is the last chance to solve the island’s problems, and the inherent threat that doom is the only alternative to agreement. That the island has been for hundreds of years a cat’s paw of competing outside powers, spitting out their fingernails of ambition onto the island, not always with happy results, is hardly open to dispute. Described by Henry Kissinger as a ‘staging-post’ and an ‘important piece of the world chequer-board’, Cyprus has for centuries been invaded, or passed from hand to hand, from English to French to Venetians to Ottoman Turks to Britain, and finally in 1960, in flawed form, to its own inhabitants, via a messy and divisive constitution. This constitution was based on positive discrimination, in favour of the Turkish Cypriots, and catered for the rights of outsiders, with almost three per cent of its territory going to Britain, along with associated rights. The treaties of 1960 that established the Republic of Cyprus were but an anachronistic extension of Britain’s colonial ethno-religious administration, dressed up in semantic sugar, but nevertheless a monkey on the back of the island’s mythical sovereignty. Few sane observers really believed that the 1960 constitution would work, particularly since the crucial question of communal boundaries in the big towns was not even agreed before independence. It took three years of bickering before the constitution collapsed in a spate of fighting and recrimination, which included the auto-ghettoisation of most of the Turkish Cypriots. Bizarrely, the collapse resulted from Foreign Office support for President Makarios’ suggested changes to the unworkable constitution. Eleven years later, following an Athens junta-inspired coup against President Makarios, Turkey invaded, and nearly all the Greek Cypriots were shoved south, becoming refugees in their own land. Even the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee wrote in 1987 that ‘the 1960 Constitution proved to be a cumbersome and frustrating instrument of government for all concerned’, while the Law Lords and Foreign Office legal advisors recognised that the Treaty of Guarantee conflicted with the UN Charter. Today the world is faced with the surrealistic situation of Turkey occupying part of the European Union, while trying itself to become a member. At present, the island’s fate seems to be divided between two main schools of thought, one partitionist, and the other integrationist. The present de facto partition looks like a historical anomaly, given that the inhabitants of the island, whether Greek-, Turkish-, Maronite- or Armenian Cypriot, had lived side by side, scattered throughout the island, for hundreds of years. Then the British came. Before demonstrating why separation is not the solution for Cyprus, and why we are at the present impasse, let us look at the phenomenon of partition itself.
The Expedient Panacea of Partition
The term ‘ partition’ is a fairly recent addition to the semantic baggage of international relations terminology, creeping into respectable academic and political language at the same as the term ‘geopolitics’ was making its Cold War comeback, along with political realism/power politics. This is no accident, since the imposition of artificial ‘business borders’ on weak areas of the world has increased exponentially since the Great War, and has been accompanied by various forms of partition. Perhaps the two most infamous cases of forced partition are those of India and Palestine, which have resulted in huge numbers of deaths.
Partition, it must be said, is a word with negative connotations, to the extent that it is often cloaked in different terminology. For its victims, it can conjure up images of apartheid, bantustanism, annexation, dismemberment, and even vivisection. For its advocates, it can serve as a convenient semantic panacea, a way of preventing people from fighting, or of liberating oppressed minorities in the name of ‘humanitarian intervention’, a term currently in vogue. Supporters of partition will rarely use the term straightforwardly, but latch onto words like ‘federation’, confederation’ and ‘zonality’, attached to words such as ‘pragmatic, or ‘realistic’. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines partition as ‘division into parts, especially political; of a country with separate areas of government’. The definition is perhaps of necessity vague, and as such could imply for some condominium, cantonisation, federalism and confederalism. At an extreme, and using perhaps an excess of logic, partition could even be construed as applying to the United States, since federal states could be seen as separate areas of government. But no outsiders forced the federal system on America. Another, but very different, case of unforced partition, is that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Conversely, following the last war, outsiders forced partition on Germany, but it lasted only as long as the post-war order did, essentially because it was artificial. It can be reasonably said that all manner of difficult situations are attached to the catch-all word ‘partition’, which has even become an expedient hegemonolinguistic panacea for annexation, secession, and civil war, apart from being possibly the lowest common denominator of international relations. The big debate is whether partition engenders strife, or vice-versa, or which is the chicken, and which the egg. In the case of Cyprus, unnatural division has been imposed on the island, which has in turn engendered creeping, and then enforced, de facto partition. To understand why, it is history that explains effectively, rather than the quagmire of competing IR theories.
Divide et Impera
When the British rented Cyprus from the Ottomans in 1878, to control Russian power in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to watch over ‘an unstable Analolia’, they found a peaceful society, albeit one in which the majority Greek-speaking Christians were second class citizens, as elsewhere in the crumbling Ottoman Empire. British even-handedness was therefore welcomed, as the ‘underdogs’ found themselves with the same rights as the Turkish-speaking Moslems. Christians no longer had to get off their donkeys when approaching a Moslem. As calls among the 82% majority for union with Greece grew, the British recognised that the Church of Cyprus (which the Ottomans, in line with their policy of non-interference in cultural and religious life, had allowed to thrive) needed to be cut down to size. Cyprus’ new masters interfered with education, which was jealously guarded by the Church, prompting some newspapers to compare British control unfavourably with that of the Ottomans, for all the latter’s despotism. In governing, the British also ensured that in the Legislative Council, British and the minority Moslem representatives could outvote the majority Christians. ‘Divide and rule’ had begun. When in 1931 a Moslem (who became known as the ‘thirteenth Greek’) voted with the Christians in a tax matter, London simply rescinded the vote, whereupon Government House was burnt down in mass rioting, and the colonial constitution was revoked. Owing to the then Greek leader, Venizelos’, policy of friendship towards Britain and Turkey, the union movement went underground, only to emerge with a vengeance towards the end of the war, with the UN-promoted pressure for self-determination, the impending return of India to the Indians (or at least most of it), the British pull-out from Palestine, and the return of the Dodecanese islands to Greece. Britain’s strategic obsessions in controlling the Middle East, and therefore Cyprus, in fear of the old Russian bugbear, put paid to any hope of freedom for the Cypriots. This was despite the fact that the Foreign Office had written that the Soviet Union had no interest in spreading communism in Greece, and despite Churchill’s agreement with Stalin that Greece would be 10% Russian and 90% English. There was even American and some high-level Foreign Office pressure to give Cyprus to Greece. Nevertheless, it was the Cold War and Colonial and Foreign Office hawks who won the day. The Greek government was initially nonplussed, and then angered, when the British refused even to discuss Cyprus. As pressure on Britain increased, the government turned to ‘divide and rule’ tactics. The British government worked secretly with Turkey, helping it with its propaganda. Hostilities broke out on 1 April 1955, and the following year, Britain called a conference of itself, Greece and Turkey, with the express aim of bringing in Turkey to an already complicated equation, in defiance of the Treaty of Lausanne, which forbade Turkey from having any responsibilities whatsoever in former Ottoman territories. The head of the Foreign Office called the conference to, in his own words, ‘seriously embarrass the Greek Government’ and to ‘define’ and ‘expose’ Greek and Turkish differences. As the Foreign Office predicted, the conference blew up almost at the start, and was followed by massive anti-Greek rioting in Turkey, and the end of not only Greek- and Turkish Cypriot friendship but, more ominously, the end of the correct Greek-Turkish relations that Venizelos and the Turkish leader, Ataturk, had established in 1930. Greek and Turkish relations have never recovered from the event, which was compounded when most of the remaining Greek citizens and Turkish citizens of Greek stock and religion were hounded out of Istanbul in 1964.
As the Greek Cypriots fought the British, pinning down up to thirty thousand soldiers, the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, was deported to the Seychelles, and Britain hired hundreds of auxiliary police, who, of course, happened to be Turkish Cypriot. It was mainly American pressure that forced the British to give way. The British, with the Greek and Turkish leaders of the time, came to an agreement, whereby Cyprus would gain independence, with no partition or union allowed. The Greek Cypriots were hardly allowed to participate, with Archbishop Makarios and a small team being allowed in towards the end of the negotiations. As we have seen above, the whole pack of cards collapsed in 1963.
Subtle Partition
By this time, and especially because of the Suez debâcle of 1956, Cyprus had assumed considerable importance for the USA, as well as Britain. Indeed, perhaps the main reason for Britain’s de facto annexation of two bits of the island in 1960 (Britain would, rather, claim that she had generously given most of Cyprus back) was the electronic intelligence-gathering facilities that had been moved to Cyprus. The age of Britain as one of the USA’s Middle East proxies had begun. Following the outbreak of violence in 1963, the Americans decided that the only solution to keep Cyprus from becoming too independent, and trying to reclaim the British territories, was partition. Thus, just as a hard-working British naval commander was bringing the Greek- and Turkish Cypriots together again, an American Assistant Secretary of State, George Ball, told him: ‘ Very impressive, but you’ve got it all wrong, son. Hasn’t anyone told you that our objective here is partition, not re-integration?’ The resulting Ball/Acheson plan was roundly rejected by Archbishop Makarios, since it would have meant the end of the republic, and quite possibly have led to more strife in the future, as has often happened with forced partition. But the Archbishop’s stance earned him the American government’s enmity, and the wholly incorrect epithet of the ‘Red Bishop’. Ever since then, partition has never been off the agenda.
Kissinger’s Partition
Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1967, and the return of around twelve thousand Greek troops to Greece, the writing was on the wall, as extremists in the US-supported Greek junta, and in Cyprus, did their utmost to get rid of Archbishop Makarios. It was the coup against Makarios, in July 1974, that gave Turkey the excuse it had been seeking to invoke Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, and intervene, ostensibly ‘to re-establish the state of affairs created by the present Treaty [of Guarantee]’. Britain’s refusal to honour its treaty obligations made it easier for the Turks to act with impunity. The fact that Kissinger (who by that time was running a one-man show in American foreign policy, as Watergate was coming to a head) did not denounce the coup, delayed recognising Makarios as the rightful leader, and did not call for the return to Greece of the Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard (and pressured the British not to), was extremely useful to the Turks, who thus had an excuse to intervene. They landed in Cyprus on 20 July. Far from re-establishing the previous state of affairs, the Turkish army began a creeping invasion, during frenetic negotiations in Geneva between the British, Turks and the new Greek government. The British Ambassador in Washington wrote that ‘the Turks could reasonably gamble that American disapproval would not be so forceful as to compel them to stop.’ To compound matters, when the Turks began their second, massive invasion and takeover of over one third of the island on 14 August, Kissinger refused to attend a NATO meeting before the 19th, thus affording the Turkish armed forces the time they needed to consolidate their occupation. The bandied-about Turkish justification for intervening was to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. This has however been shown to false, since the High Commission and the Commander of British forces in Cyprus made it plain that the Turkish Cypriots were in no danger, and that Turkey was simply seeking to invade. During the Geneva negotiations, Kissinger had already refused to see the new Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, even though the latter was prepared to come to Washington. It would obviously have made it difficult for the Turks to take over, while their chief overseas supporter was parleying with the Greeks. It is hardly surprising that Kissinger wrote later that the Cyprus problem was solved in 1974. One does not need to read the rumbustious and journalistic screeds of Christopher Hitchens to understand that Kissinger’s role was not honourable. The diplomatic documents of the supine Wilson government suffice to demonstrate this. Even as far back as 1971, a senior British diplomat had written: ‘It is impossible to square Kissinger’s expressed views with reality… it is rather his manner of conceiving foreign policy without reference to, or knowledge of, the State Department or anyone else which is most worrying. It leaves one with the fear that any day something could go seriously wrong because the normal sources of advice, restraint and executions are wholly by-passed.’ More tellingly, Kissinger said in 1974 that Cyprus was important in the Arab/Israel dispute, meaning that he considered the Britsh bases important to the defence of the Jewish State.
The Annan Scheme
Since the invasion and occupation, partition has never been off the agenda, only now the problem for those in favour of partition is more about how to legitimise the illegal and forced partition that exists, but using less cruel words. Just before he left the US Administration, Kissinger threw in his solution, which included the vague phrase; ‘the establishment of a federal system on a bizonal basis with relatively autonomous zones’. Makarios later bit the bullet, agreeing in early 1977, six months before his untimely death, to an ‘independent, non-aligned and bi-communal Cyporus’. But it made, and until now, has made no difference to Turkey’s aims of establishing a separate entity on Cyprus, through their forty thousand occupation troops and the importing of, at the last count, 160,000 illegal settlers, who now outnumber the dwindling (and slowly emigrating) original Turkish Cypriots by two to one.
The latest concerted attempt to subtly legalise the Turkish invasion a fortiori, prevent genuine integration, and ensure that Cyprus remains an object of external powers, without an independent foreign policy, was the so-called Annan Plan. The scheme was triggered by Cyprus’s impending membership of the European Union in 2004. With a member state occupied by an applicant, it would have been ridiculous to expect Cyprus, or indeed any member other than Britain, to support Turkey’s application. The first reason for the scheme’s introduction was that Cyprus’s EU membership posed a perceived threat to Anglo-American interests, which centre on the electronic intelligence gathering stations and Turkey having a strong strategic stake in Cyprus, particularly important given its (albeit currently shaky) military co-operation with Israel. Second, was the planned attack on Iraq, where the US and Britain needed to keep Turkey as sweet as they could. Third, was that by weakening the idea of an integrated state with a single independent foreign policy, and perpetuating institutional divisions, the scheme would keep Cyprus out of mainstream European security structures, since this would infuriate Turkey. This explains the flurry by Britain and the USA to sign with Turkey the so-called ‘Ankara Agreements’ in 2001, whereby it was agreed that Turkey would have a say in any putative ESDP operations in the Aegean and around Cyprus. The agreement was signed without EU authorisation, which annoyed Brussels, even if the ESDP only operates ‘when NATO is otherwise engaged’. An angry Greece then secured additions to the agreement whereby, somewhat farcically, it was agreed that no NATO member would threaten the use of, or use, force against another NATO member. In short, with US and British support, the Turkish military was using Cyprus to keep the EU out of the Eastern Aegean, and away from Greek islands which it periodically threatens with military overflights. Fourth, were Turkey’s membership aspirations per se. Had the plan been agreed, it would have smoothed Turkey’s path into the EU, and removed Greek Cypriot property claims from the ambit of European justice. The most blatant, yet curiously overlooked, evidence of this, was Britain and America’s persistent attempts to have Greece, Cyprus and Turkey (as well as Britain itself) sign a so-called ‘Foundation Agreement’ which, apart from perpetuating some of the most divisive aspects of the1960 treaties, entailed them agreeing a priori to support Turkey’s accession to the European Union. This was a complete infringement of sovereignty and would have weakened the EU’s very raison d’être.
Most bizarrely, the complete plan, of some ten thousand pages, was not put onto the UN website until one minute to midnight, on 23 April, the day before the referendum. It is hardly surprising that it was massively rejected by the Greek Cypriots, yet accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, but we shall never know the true vote of the latter, since the illegal settlers were allowed to vote. It has been said that even the occupation troops were allowed to vote, but I have not yet been able to verify this. If the plan had been accepted, it would have perpetuated the inherently unstable parts of the 1960 treaties, including the divisive aspects and the positive discrimination, which had been the institutional cause of the 1963 breakdown in the first place. By allowing a large proportion of illegal settlers to remain, further seeds of division would have been sown. Importantly, it would have weakened EU cohesion yet more than at present, by undermining EU law.
Then is Now
Guicciardini, considered the founder of modern historical research methods (i.e. recourse to original documents) wrote that things have always been the same, the past sheds light on the future, and that the same things return with different colours. Cyprus is a prime example of this. Just as Britain obtained it for strategic reasons, so the USA and Britain now need it for similar ones. Even if Britain did try to give up the bases following the invasion, and continued trying for at least three years afterwards, the USA simply said no, although a secret suggestion was made that the US would finance them, with discussions taking place. Today, British Middle East policy is part and parcel of America’s, and any attempt to relinquish its territories would be met with strong US resistance. The de facto partition continues, while Turkey continues to use the island as a hostage to gain entry to the EU, and advantages (political rather than legal) in the Aegean. The thought of two entirely independent states is unacceptable to the outside power-brokers, since a new international border would render the 1960 treaties, and therefore the bases, even shakier in terms of UN and EU law than they are at present. Better, they secretly say, to keep Cyprus as a de facto protectorate, but disguise this in a semantic overcoat, while maintaining the modus vivendi, to prevent all-out war between Greece and Turkey, which would weaken the NATO alliance to Russia’s benefit. In the sixties and seventies, the Foreign Office itself questioned the legality of the Treaty of Guarantee, admitted that the three treaties were interdependent, and wrote that anything which called the 1960 settlement as a whole into question could expose Britain to pressure to hang on to the bases, and that they would become increasingly anachronistic in world public opinion. It is these very treaties that have been a monkey on the back of the idea of a properly united island, where every inhabitant, of whatever persuasion, is protected by EU law, which would render the unnatural and forced separation untenable. It is clear that Cyprus has always been coveted by outside powers, and still is, whatever the lip service paid to self-determination. The case of Cyprus is interesting in that dissection came very late to the island, the result of outside interference, against the grain of its natural economic and cultural development over centuries. Extremist forces in Britain, Greece and Turkey caused radicalisation among extremist sections of the population, leading to the present impasse. It is often tempting to outside pundits to compare Cyprus to successful cases of division, such as the former Czechoslovakia, and then say, as the Turkish government does, that a Czech solution would work. This is ingeniously ingenuous (inadvertently or otherwise), however, since Turkey would not permit a new international Greece-friendly border so near to Turkey itself. Moreover, Czechoslovakia managed its divorce amicably, with very little outside interference. In the case of Cyprus, foreign interference, and particularly Turkish control over its occupied zone, would not permit the legal inhabitants themselves to work out their own destiny. Nor would they take kindly to an EU effort to enforce the acquis communautaire throughout the whole island, since this would threaten, from their point of view, their security. EU foreign policy cohesion is in any case virtually non-existent, one reason being the massive enlargement that has made decision-making so cumbersome, bedeviling a serious Common Foreign and Security Policy, as envisaged at Maastricht.
Conclusions
Although Cyprus and other cases of partition can be juxtaposed, actual comparison is difficult in detail. But some general lessons can be drawn. First is the fact that external involvement is often a factor. Former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, in particular, show us the danger of implanting alien populations in conquered territories, since they are themselves potential future seeds of partition, even generations later, usually because of externally influenced radicalisation. Kosovo is a case in point. Sri Lanka is an even more poignant example. During the colonial era, Britain brought in hundreds of thousands of Hindu Tamils to Buddhist Ceylon, with dreadful results generations later. Even Ireland cannot escape from a modicum of comparison, in that at around the same time as the Ottoman empire was settling Moslem Anatolians, and Janissaries, in Cyprus, so the English were settling radical Protestants in Roman Catholic Ireland. The partition of almost one hundred years ago did not solve the problem, and it is difficult to be certain that there will not be future strife, despite the enormous help of the USA, which has consistently pressured the British government behind the scenes to be more accommodating.
Cyprus’s fate can only be properly comprehended within the context of the interests of NATO, the EU, Turkey and Israel. As such, a clear-cut solution is a tough target. Too many people want a piece of the cake. A genuine federation, agreed in 1977, and confirmed in numerous UN resolutions since then is, at least theoretically, and hopefully in practice, the only viable basis for a solution. But it can only be achieved without the self-interested meddling of outside stakeholders, without reverting to outdated treaties that have proven to be the institutional worm in the apple. The EU, for its own self-respect, needs to adopt a more active position in the interests of all Cypriots, through its own soft power. Without this, Cyprus will continue to be a cat’s paw, rather than a fully-fledged sovereign state, a state in which Greek- and Turkish Cypriot alike would have the same individual rights as Moslems and Christians in the USA. Let us conclude by quoting from Galo Plaza’s 1965 report to the United Nations: ‘If the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction’.
William Mallinson, a former British diplomat, is Lecturer in British history, literature and culture at the Ionian University. He was awarded his doctorate, in international history, by the London School of Economics. He has numerous academic (and some media) publications. His books are: Public Lies and Private Truths: an Anatomy of Public Relations (Cassell, London, 1996 and Leader Books, Athens, 2000), Portrait of an Ambassador: the Life, Times and Writings of Themistocles Chrysanthopoulos (Attica Tradition Educational Foundation, Athens, 1998), Cyprus: a Modern History, published in Greek and English (I.B. Tauris, London and New York, Papazissis, Athens), Partition Through Foreign Aggression ( University of Minnesota, 2010), From Neutrality to Commitment: Dutch Foreign Policy, NATO and European Integration (I.B. Tauris, 2010); Cyprus: Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations (I.B.Tauris, 2010, and, in Greek, Estia, Athens, 2010); and Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since World War Two (I.B. Tauris, 2011) .
His speciality is archival research into post-World War Two diplomatic relations, with particular reference to Anglo-Greek-US relations, and European defence policy.
Saturday, December 10, 2011
TERROR
Security Can Terrorise
By Dr William Mallinson
One would not normally associate US Vice President Cheney with terrorising small Greek children, only Iraqi ones. The connexion however comes through his financial and executive connexion with Halliburton, which has enriched itself with the blood of Iraqis. The company has a major stake in the Anglo-American Group Four-Securicor, which in turn owns Wackenhut, well known for running private prisons where inmates have been known to commit suicide. The Greek connexion is that Wackenhut checks outgoing travellers at Athens Airport.
Security is a lucrative business: the obsession with the ‘war on terror’ helps Anglo-American and Israeli security companies to win large contracts. Once, well-trained Greek policemen were responsible for checking travellers at Ellinikon Airport, as they still do at other airports, although Halliburton is now making inroads at regional airports, such as Corfu. Then big business got in the way. The following story illustrates why El. Venizelos Airport’s most sensitive tasks should be carried out by the police or, at least, Greek-owned security companies.
In August 2005, an Anglo-Greek couple with their two small children, five and seven, were travelling to London with Olympic Airlines. A (female) Wackenhut employee told the father that she would like to check his daughter’s toybag. When he insisted that she wear gloves, she accused him of not allowing the bag to be searched. This led to another (female) employee pretending to call the police; pretending, because had they come, the father would have accused the employees of threatening behaviour. In the meantime, the frightened children were hand-searched and heard one of the employees refer to terrorists. When the father insisted on taking the employees’ names, they became even more agitated, particularly since an Olympic Airlines employee had come to see why the London flight was being delayed. The mother asked one of the Wackenhut employees whether she realised that they might miss their flight, whereupon she replied: “That’s not my problem”. By this time, gloves had magically arrived, and since the two badly-trained, impolite and insecure employees could think of no more excuses to delay the family, it caught its flight.
But what of the children? During the farrago, the seven-year old daughter asked the mother what a terrorist was. She turned red and was crying, while her five-year old brother said: “Stop crying or the police will catch us”. For several weeks afterwards, the parents had to deal with their children’s questions, one of which was: “Why did we make those people think we are terrorists?” When the family went through London Airport to return to Athens, the children were treated gently, not barbarically, and not even hand-searched.
It took six months for the family’s complaint to be dealt with, during which time a Mr Papatrechas of Wackenhut wrote to say that the staff were being trained. But the father’s specific question about what precise action was taken was not answered. Until he contacted Group Four-Securicor in Britain. Mr Antonopoulos of the Greek Airport Authority, who insisted, wrongly, that the complaint be translated into Greek, then wrote to say: “Said persons (Ba******* and Cha**********) have been severely reprimanded and serious disciplinary action shall be taken against them should they exhibit similar behaviour in the future (etc)…”
Security is of course important at airports, but when profits are put above people (are plastic gloves really too expensive for foreign shareholders?), training suffers. A deeper, final question is to what extent the Greek state, in other words the Greek people, are allowed to control their own security. No foreign-owned security company should be allowed to terrorise Greek children.
Και η ασφάλεια μπορεί να τρομοκρατήσει
Του Δρ. Ουίλλιαμ Μάλλινσον
Μετάφραση στην Ελληνική: Θοδωρής Μπουχέλος
Είναι γεγονός ότι δεν έχουμε συνηθίσει να ακούμε τον Αμερικανό αντιπρόεδρο Τσέινι να τρομοκρατεί τα παιδιά Ελλήνων –μόνο Ιρακινών. Στην περίπτωση όμως αυτή εμπλέκεται ως επικεφαλής της Halliburton, η οποία έχει πλουτίσει με το αίμα του ιρακινού λαού. Η εταιρεία κατέχει υψηλόβαθμη θέση στον αγγλοαμερικανικό όμιλο Group 4-Securicor, στον οποίον ανήκει η Wackenhut, πασίγνωστη για τις απόπειρες αυτοκτονίας των κρατουμένων στις ιδιωτικές φυλακές που διατηρεί. Σε ελληνικό επίπεδο, η Wackenhut έχει αναλάβει τον έλεγχο των εξερχομένων ταξιδιωτών στον Διεθνή Αερολιμένα Αθηνών.
Η ασφάλεια είναι επικερδής υπόθεση: η εμμονή με τον «πόλεμο εναντίον της τρομοκρατίας» έχει βοηθήσει τις αγγλοαμερικανικές και ισραηλινές εταιρείες ασφαλείας να «χτυπήσουν» τεράστια συμβόλαια. Κάποτε, υπεύθυνοι για τον έλεγχο των επιβατών στο αεροδρόμιο του Ελληνικού ήσαν εξαιρετικής εκπαιδεύσεως Έλληνες αστυνομικοί, όπως γίνεται και σε άλλα αεροδρόμια. Η ακόλουθη ιστορία αποδεικνύει για ποιον λόγο οι διάφορες νευραλγικές θέσεις του «Ελ. Βενιζέλος» θα έπρεπε να καλύπτονται από την Αστυνομία –ή τουλάχιστον από ελληνικής ιδιοκτησίας εταιρείες ασφαλείας.
Πέρσι τον Αύγουστο, μια τετραμελής ελληνική οικογένεια, με παιδιά ηλικίας 6 και 8 ετών, ταξίδευε προς Λονδίνο με τις Ολυμπιακές Αερογραμμές. Στο αεροδρόμιο, η υπάλληλος της “Wackenhut” είπε στον πατέρα ότι θέλει να ελέγξει το σακίδιο της κόρης του. Όταν εκείνος επέμεινε ότι η υπάλληλος θα έπρεπε να φορέσει γάντια, αυτή τον κατηγόρησε ότι δεν επέτρεπε τον έλεγχο του σακιδίου. Η υπόθεση έφτασε σε μια άλλη υπάλληλο, η οποία έκανε ότι καλεί την Αστυνομία –και λέω «έκανε», διότι εάν έρχονταν τα όργανα της τάξεως, ο πατέρας θα είχε την ευκαιρία να κατηγορήσει τους υπαλλήλους για απειλητική συμπεριφορά. Εν τω μεταξύ, τα τρομαγμένα παιδάκια περνούσαν από σωματικό έλεγχο και άκουσαν μία από τις υπαλλήλους να αναφέρεται σε τρομοκράτες. Όταν ο πατέρας επέμεινε να του δώσουν οι υπάλληλοι τα ονόματά τους, εκείνες αγρίεψαν ακόμα περισσότερο, ιδίως αφού στο σημείο είχε καταφθάσει υπάλληλος των Ολυμπιακών Αερογραμμών για να διαπιστώσει γιατί καθυστερούσε η πτήση για Λονδίνο. Η μητέρα ρώτησε μία από τις υπαλλήλους της Wackenhut αν είχε συνειδητοποιήσει ότι θα έχαναν την πτήση τους και έλαβε την απάντηση: «Αυτό δεν είναι δικό μου πρόβλημα». Ως δια μαγείας, τα γάντια έκαναν την εμφάνισή τους και, αφού οι ανεκπαίδευτες, αγενείς και ανασφαλείς υπάλληλοι δεν μπορούσαν να βρουν άλλες δικαιολογίες για να τους καθυστερήσουν, η οικογένεια πρόλαβε την πτήση της.
Τί έγινε, όμως, με τα παιδάκια; Κατά τη διάρκεια του επεισοδίου, η οκτάχρονη κόρη ρώτησε τη μητέρα της τί θα πει τρομοκράτης. Είχε κατακοκκινίσει και έκλαιγε ενώ το εξάχρονο αδελφάκι της τής είπε: «Σταμάτα να κλαις γιατί θα μας πιάσει η Αστυνομία». Επί αρκετές εβδομάδες μετά το συμβάν, οι γονείς είχαν να αντιμετωπίσουν τις ερωτήσεις των παιδιών τους, μία εκ των οποίων ήταν: «Τί κάναμε και νόμιζαν αυτοί οι άνθρωποι ότι είμαστε τρομοκράτες;» Όταν, κατά την επιστροφή της στην Αθήνα, η οικογένεια πέρασε από το αεροδρόμιο του Λονδίνου, οι εκεί υπεύθυνοι ήσαν ευγενέστατοι προς τα παιδιά –και όχι βάρβαροι- και, φυσικά, δεν τα πέρασαν καν από σωματικό έλεγχο.
Πέρασαν έξη μήνες πριν κάποιος ασχοληθεί με την καταγγελία της οικογενείας, κατά τη διάρκεια των οποίων κάποιος κ. Παπατρέχας της Wackenhut τους έγραψε, αναφέροντας ότι το εν λόγω προσωπικό ήταν εκπαιδευόμενο. Αλλά το ερώτημα του πατέρα σχετικώς με τα μέτρα που επρόκειτο να ληφθούν δεν έλαβε απάντηση. Μέχρι που επικοινώνησε με τον όμιλο Group Four-Securicor στη Βρετανία. Ο κ. Αντωνόπουλος της Υπηρεσίας Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας του απηύθυνε επιστολή αναφέροντας ότι «έχουν γίνει αυστηρές παρατηρήσεις- συστάσεις στα εν λόγω άτομα και ότι θα υπάρξουν αυστηρές κυρώσεις σε βάρος τους αν τυχόν παρατηρηθεί στο μέλλον παρόμοιο περιστατικό...» (κτλ.).
Είναι σαφές ότι η ασφάλεια είναι σημαντική στα αεροδρόμια, αλλά όταν το κέρδος μπαίνει πάνω από τους ανθρώπους (μα, τόσο ακριβά φαίνονται πια τα πλαστικά γάντια στους ξένους μετόχους;), το αποτέλεσμα είναι εις βάρος της σωστής καταρτίσεως. Και το τελικό, βαθύτερο ερώτημα, είναι σε ποιον βαθμό είναι σε θέση το ελληνικό κράτος –δηλαδή ο Έλληνας πολίτης- να ελέγχει την ασφάλειά του. Δεν θα έπρεπε να επιτρέπεται σε ξένες εταιρείες ασφαλείας να τρομοκρατούν Ελληνόπουλα...
Security Can Seriously Damage Your Health
By Dr William Mallinson
Whichever minister is responsible for Wackenhut searching travellers and their belongings at Athens Airport has a lot to answer for. The company, owned by the England-based Group 4 Securicor –owned in turn by the infamous US-based Haliburton- has not only mistreated small Greek children (see Eleftherotypia of 9 October) but ignored security procedures: on 13 November, a Wackenhut employee (rudely refusing to give her name) removed and confiscated two 150ml cans of tomato juice from a traveller’s bag. Her supervisor pretended to call the police. Worst of all, however, the traveller then discovered a third 150ml can in his bag, once on the aeroplane.
Matters have gone from bad to worse: the profit-obsessed conglomerate then sacked 350 staff, who have simply been replaced by their Group 4 Securicor sidekicks. The angry Wackenhut staff are now accusing their replacements of being inexperienced (which they are!) and of risking travellers’ safety. This is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The only difference following the “replacements” is that they wear Group 4 Securicor badges and that there are enormous delays. If they are sacked, perhaps we shall soon be seeing Haliburton badges.
The whole question of who really controls the safety of air travellers –and the broader question of to what extent Greece and the Greeks succumb to foreign interests- is currently particularly germane, since there are reportedly moves afoot in parliament to allow these hurriedly “trained” and inexperienced private “security” staff to carry guns.
The only sensible answer is for private companies to protect private money (banks) and property, leaving the sensitive task of travellers’ security to the far more experienced police, a task they perform admirably at other Greek airports.
In the meantime, the traveller is awaiting the response of the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority to the above-mentioned security breach. They have been courteous, as has the Head of Airport Security, Fotis Lianos, and the Security Planning Director, Chryssoula Falagaris. But words are not enough. Actions are needed.
Η Ασφάλεια Βλάπτει Σοβαρά την Υγεία
του Δρ. Ουίλλιαμ Μάλλινσον
Μετάφραση Θοδωρής Μπουχέλος
Ο Υπουργός ο οποίος είναι υπεύθυνος για το ότι η Wackenhut ψάχνει τους ταξιδιώτες και τις αποσκευές τους στον Διεθνή Αερολιμένα Αθηνών έχει να λογοδοτήσει για πολλά. Η εταιρεία, που ανήκει στην αγγλική Group 4 Securicor –η οποία, με τη σειρά της, ανήκει στην διαβόητη αμερικανική Haliburton- όχι μόνο κακομεταχειρίζεται παιδάκια (βλ. Ελευθεροτυπία 9ης Οκτωβρίου) αλλά παραβλέπει και διαδικασίες ασφαλείας: στις 13 Νοεμβρίου, μία υπάλληλος της Wackenhut (η οποία αρνήθηκε αγενέστατα να δώσει το όνομά της) κατέσχεσε από την τσάντα επιβάτη δύο κουτάκια των 150ml με τοματοχυμό. Ο προϊστάμενός της προσποιήθηκε ότι καλεί την αστυνομία και –το χειρότερο- όταν ο ταξιδιώτης βρέθηκε στο αεροσκάφος, ανεκάλυψε ένα τρίτο κουτάκι των 150ml στην τσάντα του.
Η κατάσταση έχει πάει από το κακό στο χειρότερο: η κοινοπραξία αυτή –με αποκλειστικό γνώμονα το κέρδος- απέλυσε 350 υπαλλήλους, τους οποίους απλώς αντικατέστησε με άτομα της Group 4 Securicor. Οι εξαγριωμένοι απολυμένοι της Wackenhut κατηγορούν τώρα τους αντικαταστάτες τους για έλλειψη εμπειρίας (κάτι που ισχύει) και ότι τίθεται σε κίνδυνο η ασφάλεια των επιβατών. Είπε ο γάιδαρος τον πετεινό κεφάλα… Η μόνη διαφορά μεταξύ των μεν υπαλλήλων από τους δε είναι ότι οι τελευταίοι φέρουν διακριτικά της Group 4 Securicor και ότι σημειώνονται απίστευτες καθυστερήσεις στον έλεγχο χειραποσκευών. Σε περίπτωση που απολυθούν και οι «καινούργιοι», δεν αποκλείεται οι επόμενοι να έχουν διακριτικά της Haliburton…
Το όλο ζήτημα του ποιος πραγματικά ελέγχει την ασφάλεια των επιβατών στα αεροδρόμια –και το ευρύτερο θέμα του μέχρι ποίου σημείου θα υποκύψουν Ελλάδα και Έλληνες στα ξένα συμφέροντα- είναι ιδιαιτέρως επίκαιρο επί της παρούσης, αφού ακούγεται πως γίνονται κινήσεις στη Βουλή προκειμένου να επιτραπεί σε αυτούς τους πρόχειρα εκπαιδευμένους και άπειρους «σεκιουριτάδες» να οπλοφορούν.
Η μόνη λογική απάντηση είναι να επιστρέψουν οι ιδιωτικές εταιρείες φυλάξεως στην προστασία του χρήματος (τράπεζες) και της περιουσίας των ιδιωτών και να αφήσουν την ασφάλεια των επιβατών στους μακράν εμπειρότερους αστυνομικούς, οι οποίοι επιτελούν αξιοθαύμαστα το καθήκον τους στους υπόλοιπους ελληνικούς αερολιμένες.
Εν τω μεταξύ, ο επιβάτης της ιστορίας μας εξακολουθεί να περιμένει απάντηση από την Ελληνική Υπηρεσία Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας σχετικώς με το προαναφερθέν περιστατικό ασφαλείας. Όλοι τους ήσαν ευγενέστατοι, όπως επίσης και ο Επικεφαλής Ασφαλείας του Αερολιμένα, κ. Φώτης Λιανός και η Τομεάρχης Σχεδιασμού Ασφαλείας, κ. Χρυσούλα Φαλαγάρη. Αλλά δεν αρκούν τα λόγια –χρειάζονται πράξεις.
By Dr William Mallinson
One would not normally associate US Vice President Cheney with terrorising small Greek children, only Iraqi ones. The connexion however comes through his financial and executive connexion with Halliburton, which has enriched itself with the blood of Iraqis. The company has a major stake in the Anglo-American Group Four-Securicor, which in turn owns Wackenhut, well known for running private prisons where inmates have been known to commit suicide. The Greek connexion is that Wackenhut checks outgoing travellers at Athens Airport.
Security is a lucrative business: the obsession with the ‘war on terror’ helps Anglo-American and Israeli security companies to win large contracts. Once, well-trained Greek policemen were responsible for checking travellers at Ellinikon Airport, as they still do at other airports, although Halliburton is now making inroads at regional airports, such as Corfu. Then big business got in the way. The following story illustrates why El. Venizelos Airport’s most sensitive tasks should be carried out by the police or, at least, Greek-owned security companies.
In August 2005, an Anglo-Greek couple with their two small children, five and seven, were travelling to London with Olympic Airlines. A (female) Wackenhut employee told the father that she would like to check his daughter’s toybag. When he insisted that she wear gloves, she accused him of not allowing the bag to be searched. This led to another (female) employee pretending to call the police; pretending, because had they come, the father would have accused the employees of threatening behaviour. In the meantime, the frightened children were hand-searched and heard one of the employees refer to terrorists. When the father insisted on taking the employees’ names, they became even more agitated, particularly since an Olympic Airlines employee had come to see why the London flight was being delayed. The mother asked one of the Wackenhut employees whether she realised that they might miss their flight, whereupon she replied: “That’s not my problem”. By this time, gloves had magically arrived, and since the two badly-trained, impolite and insecure employees could think of no more excuses to delay the family, it caught its flight.
But what of the children? During the farrago, the seven-year old daughter asked the mother what a terrorist was. She turned red and was crying, while her five-year old brother said: “Stop crying or the police will catch us”. For several weeks afterwards, the parents had to deal with their children’s questions, one of which was: “Why did we make those people think we are terrorists?” When the family went through London Airport to return to Athens, the children were treated gently, not barbarically, and not even hand-searched.
It took six months for the family’s complaint to be dealt with, during which time a Mr Papatrechas of Wackenhut wrote to say that the staff were being trained. But the father’s specific question about what precise action was taken was not answered. Until he contacted Group Four-Securicor in Britain. Mr Antonopoulos of the Greek Airport Authority, who insisted, wrongly, that the complaint be translated into Greek, then wrote to say: “Said persons (Ba******* and Cha**********) have been severely reprimanded and serious disciplinary action shall be taken against them should they exhibit similar behaviour in the future (etc)…”
Security is of course important at airports, but when profits are put above people (are plastic gloves really too expensive for foreign shareholders?), training suffers. A deeper, final question is to what extent the Greek state, in other words the Greek people, are allowed to control their own security. No foreign-owned security company should be allowed to terrorise Greek children.
Και η ασφάλεια μπορεί να τρομοκρατήσει
Του Δρ. Ουίλλιαμ Μάλλινσον
Μετάφραση στην Ελληνική: Θοδωρής Μπουχέλος
Είναι γεγονός ότι δεν έχουμε συνηθίσει να ακούμε τον Αμερικανό αντιπρόεδρο Τσέινι να τρομοκρατεί τα παιδιά Ελλήνων –μόνο Ιρακινών. Στην περίπτωση όμως αυτή εμπλέκεται ως επικεφαλής της Halliburton, η οποία έχει πλουτίσει με το αίμα του ιρακινού λαού. Η εταιρεία κατέχει υψηλόβαθμη θέση στον αγγλοαμερικανικό όμιλο Group 4-Securicor, στον οποίον ανήκει η Wackenhut, πασίγνωστη για τις απόπειρες αυτοκτονίας των κρατουμένων στις ιδιωτικές φυλακές που διατηρεί. Σε ελληνικό επίπεδο, η Wackenhut έχει αναλάβει τον έλεγχο των εξερχομένων ταξιδιωτών στον Διεθνή Αερολιμένα Αθηνών.
Η ασφάλεια είναι επικερδής υπόθεση: η εμμονή με τον «πόλεμο εναντίον της τρομοκρατίας» έχει βοηθήσει τις αγγλοαμερικανικές και ισραηλινές εταιρείες ασφαλείας να «χτυπήσουν» τεράστια συμβόλαια. Κάποτε, υπεύθυνοι για τον έλεγχο των επιβατών στο αεροδρόμιο του Ελληνικού ήσαν εξαιρετικής εκπαιδεύσεως Έλληνες αστυνομικοί, όπως γίνεται και σε άλλα αεροδρόμια. Η ακόλουθη ιστορία αποδεικνύει για ποιον λόγο οι διάφορες νευραλγικές θέσεις του «Ελ. Βενιζέλος» θα έπρεπε να καλύπτονται από την Αστυνομία –ή τουλάχιστον από ελληνικής ιδιοκτησίας εταιρείες ασφαλείας.
Πέρσι τον Αύγουστο, μια τετραμελής ελληνική οικογένεια, με παιδιά ηλικίας 6 και 8 ετών, ταξίδευε προς Λονδίνο με τις Ολυμπιακές Αερογραμμές. Στο αεροδρόμιο, η υπάλληλος της “Wackenhut” είπε στον πατέρα ότι θέλει να ελέγξει το σακίδιο της κόρης του. Όταν εκείνος επέμεινε ότι η υπάλληλος θα έπρεπε να φορέσει γάντια, αυτή τον κατηγόρησε ότι δεν επέτρεπε τον έλεγχο του σακιδίου. Η υπόθεση έφτασε σε μια άλλη υπάλληλο, η οποία έκανε ότι καλεί την Αστυνομία –και λέω «έκανε», διότι εάν έρχονταν τα όργανα της τάξεως, ο πατέρας θα είχε την ευκαιρία να κατηγορήσει τους υπαλλήλους για απειλητική συμπεριφορά. Εν τω μεταξύ, τα τρομαγμένα παιδάκια περνούσαν από σωματικό έλεγχο και άκουσαν μία από τις υπαλλήλους να αναφέρεται σε τρομοκράτες. Όταν ο πατέρας επέμεινε να του δώσουν οι υπάλληλοι τα ονόματά τους, εκείνες αγρίεψαν ακόμα περισσότερο, ιδίως αφού στο σημείο είχε καταφθάσει υπάλληλος των Ολυμπιακών Αερογραμμών για να διαπιστώσει γιατί καθυστερούσε η πτήση για Λονδίνο. Η μητέρα ρώτησε μία από τις υπαλλήλους της Wackenhut αν είχε συνειδητοποιήσει ότι θα έχαναν την πτήση τους και έλαβε την απάντηση: «Αυτό δεν είναι δικό μου πρόβλημα». Ως δια μαγείας, τα γάντια έκαναν την εμφάνισή τους και, αφού οι ανεκπαίδευτες, αγενείς και ανασφαλείς υπάλληλοι δεν μπορούσαν να βρουν άλλες δικαιολογίες για να τους καθυστερήσουν, η οικογένεια πρόλαβε την πτήση της.
Τί έγινε, όμως, με τα παιδάκια; Κατά τη διάρκεια του επεισοδίου, η οκτάχρονη κόρη ρώτησε τη μητέρα της τί θα πει τρομοκράτης. Είχε κατακοκκινίσει και έκλαιγε ενώ το εξάχρονο αδελφάκι της τής είπε: «Σταμάτα να κλαις γιατί θα μας πιάσει η Αστυνομία». Επί αρκετές εβδομάδες μετά το συμβάν, οι γονείς είχαν να αντιμετωπίσουν τις ερωτήσεις των παιδιών τους, μία εκ των οποίων ήταν: «Τί κάναμε και νόμιζαν αυτοί οι άνθρωποι ότι είμαστε τρομοκράτες;» Όταν, κατά την επιστροφή της στην Αθήνα, η οικογένεια πέρασε από το αεροδρόμιο του Λονδίνου, οι εκεί υπεύθυνοι ήσαν ευγενέστατοι προς τα παιδιά –και όχι βάρβαροι- και, φυσικά, δεν τα πέρασαν καν από σωματικό έλεγχο.
Πέρασαν έξη μήνες πριν κάποιος ασχοληθεί με την καταγγελία της οικογενείας, κατά τη διάρκεια των οποίων κάποιος κ. Παπατρέχας της Wackenhut τους έγραψε, αναφέροντας ότι το εν λόγω προσωπικό ήταν εκπαιδευόμενο. Αλλά το ερώτημα του πατέρα σχετικώς με τα μέτρα που επρόκειτο να ληφθούν δεν έλαβε απάντηση. Μέχρι που επικοινώνησε με τον όμιλο Group Four-Securicor στη Βρετανία. Ο κ. Αντωνόπουλος της Υπηρεσίας Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας του απηύθυνε επιστολή αναφέροντας ότι «έχουν γίνει αυστηρές παρατηρήσεις- συστάσεις στα εν λόγω άτομα και ότι θα υπάρξουν αυστηρές κυρώσεις σε βάρος τους αν τυχόν παρατηρηθεί στο μέλλον παρόμοιο περιστατικό...» (κτλ.).
Είναι σαφές ότι η ασφάλεια είναι σημαντική στα αεροδρόμια, αλλά όταν το κέρδος μπαίνει πάνω από τους ανθρώπους (μα, τόσο ακριβά φαίνονται πια τα πλαστικά γάντια στους ξένους μετόχους;), το αποτέλεσμα είναι εις βάρος της σωστής καταρτίσεως. Και το τελικό, βαθύτερο ερώτημα, είναι σε ποιον βαθμό είναι σε θέση το ελληνικό κράτος –δηλαδή ο Έλληνας πολίτης- να ελέγχει την ασφάλειά του. Δεν θα έπρεπε να επιτρέπεται σε ξένες εταιρείες ασφαλείας να τρομοκρατούν Ελληνόπουλα...
Security Can Seriously Damage Your Health
By Dr William Mallinson
Whichever minister is responsible for Wackenhut searching travellers and their belongings at Athens Airport has a lot to answer for. The company, owned by the England-based Group 4 Securicor –owned in turn by the infamous US-based Haliburton- has not only mistreated small Greek children (see Eleftherotypia of 9 October) but ignored security procedures: on 13 November, a Wackenhut employee (rudely refusing to give her name) removed and confiscated two 150ml cans of tomato juice from a traveller’s bag. Her supervisor pretended to call the police. Worst of all, however, the traveller then discovered a third 150ml can in his bag, once on the aeroplane.
Matters have gone from bad to worse: the profit-obsessed conglomerate then sacked 350 staff, who have simply been replaced by their Group 4 Securicor sidekicks. The angry Wackenhut staff are now accusing their replacements of being inexperienced (which they are!) and of risking travellers’ safety. This is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The only difference following the “replacements” is that they wear Group 4 Securicor badges and that there are enormous delays. If they are sacked, perhaps we shall soon be seeing Haliburton badges.
The whole question of who really controls the safety of air travellers –and the broader question of to what extent Greece and the Greeks succumb to foreign interests- is currently particularly germane, since there are reportedly moves afoot in parliament to allow these hurriedly “trained” and inexperienced private “security” staff to carry guns.
The only sensible answer is for private companies to protect private money (banks) and property, leaving the sensitive task of travellers’ security to the far more experienced police, a task they perform admirably at other Greek airports.
In the meantime, the traveller is awaiting the response of the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority to the above-mentioned security breach. They have been courteous, as has the Head of Airport Security, Fotis Lianos, and the Security Planning Director, Chryssoula Falagaris. But words are not enough. Actions are needed.
Η Ασφάλεια Βλάπτει Σοβαρά την Υγεία
του Δρ. Ουίλλιαμ Μάλλινσον
Μετάφραση Θοδωρής Μπουχέλος
Ο Υπουργός ο οποίος είναι υπεύθυνος για το ότι η Wackenhut ψάχνει τους ταξιδιώτες και τις αποσκευές τους στον Διεθνή Αερολιμένα Αθηνών έχει να λογοδοτήσει για πολλά. Η εταιρεία, που ανήκει στην αγγλική Group 4 Securicor –η οποία, με τη σειρά της, ανήκει στην διαβόητη αμερικανική Haliburton- όχι μόνο κακομεταχειρίζεται παιδάκια (βλ. Ελευθεροτυπία 9ης Οκτωβρίου) αλλά παραβλέπει και διαδικασίες ασφαλείας: στις 13 Νοεμβρίου, μία υπάλληλος της Wackenhut (η οποία αρνήθηκε αγενέστατα να δώσει το όνομά της) κατέσχεσε από την τσάντα επιβάτη δύο κουτάκια των 150ml με τοματοχυμό. Ο προϊστάμενός της προσποιήθηκε ότι καλεί την αστυνομία και –το χειρότερο- όταν ο ταξιδιώτης βρέθηκε στο αεροσκάφος, ανεκάλυψε ένα τρίτο κουτάκι των 150ml στην τσάντα του.
Η κατάσταση έχει πάει από το κακό στο χειρότερο: η κοινοπραξία αυτή –με αποκλειστικό γνώμονα το κέρδος- απέλυσε 350 υπαλλήλους, τους οποίους απλώς αντικατέστησε με άτομα της Group 4 Securicor. Οι εξαγριωμένοι απολυμένοι της Wackenhut κατηγορούν τώρα τους αντικαταστάτες τους για έλλειψη εμπειρίας (κάτι που ισχύει) και ότι τίθεται σε κίνδυνο η ασφάλεια των επιβατών. Είπε ο γάιδαρος τον πετεινό κεφάλα… Η μόνη διαφορά μεταξύ των μεν υπαλλήλων από τους δε είναι ότι οι τελευταίοι φέρουν διακριτικά της Group 4 Securicor και ότι σημειώνονται απίστευτες καθυστερήσεις στον έλεγχο χειραποσκευών. Σε περίπτωση που απολυθούν και οι «καινούργιοι», δεν αποκλείεται οι επόμενοι να έχουν διακριτικά της Haliburton…
Το όλο ζήτημα του ποιος πραγματικά ελέγχει την ασφάλεια των επιβατών στα αεροδρόμια –και το ευρύτερο θέμα του μέχρι ποίου σημείου θα υποκύψουν Ελλάδα και Έλληνες στα ξένα συμφέροντα- είναι ιδιαιτέρως επίκαιρο επί της παρούσης, αφού ακούγεται πως γίνονται κινήσεις στη Βουλή προκειμένου να επιτραπεί σε αυτούς τους πρόχειρα εκπαιδευμένους και άπειρους «σεκιουριτάδες» να οπλοφορούν.
Η μόνη λογική απάντηση είναι να επιστρέψουν οι ιδιωτικές εταιρείες φυλάξεως στην προστασία του χρήματος (τράπεζες) και της περιουσίας των ιδιωτών και να αφήσουν την ασφάλεια των επιβατών στους μακράν εμπειρότερους αστυνομικούς, οι οποίοι επιτελούν αξιοθαύμαστα το καθήκον τους στους υπόλοιπους ελληνικούς αερολιμένες.
Εν τω μεταξύ, ο επιβάτης της ιστορίας μας εξακολουθεί να περιμένει απάντηση από την Ελληνική Υπηρεσία Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας σχετικώς με το προαναφερθέν περιστατικό ασφαλείας. Όλοι τους ήσαν ευγενέστατοι, όπως επίσης και ο Επικεφαλής Ασφαλείας του Αερολιμένα, κ. Φώτης Λιανός και η Τομεάρχης Σχεδιασμού Ασφαλείας, κ. Χρυσούλα Φαλαγάρη. Αλλά δεν αρκούν τα λόγια –χρειάζονται πράξεις.
Thursday, December 1, 2011
FAT CATS
Fat Parliamentarian Cats
Instead of destroying the livelihoods of countless hardworking Greeks through arbitrary reductions in salaries and Ottoman-type tax increases, is it not time that the neo-Ottoman clientelistic cleptocracy in the Greek Parliament put their own house in order, by setting an example? Is it not time to scrutinise those responsible for leading Greece to doom, the three hundred members of parliament and their dragoons of overpaid assistants and ‘advisers’, many of whom only have their jobs because they helped a candidate in an election? Are your readers aware that Greece, one of the EU’s poorest members, pays its Members of Parliament over twice what a British member gets, and that, to add insult to injury, a Greek member pays very little tax? Are they aware that a British Member of Parliament earns about thrice that of a young policeman, while in Greece, they earn about ten times that of a young Greek policeman? Are they aware that Greece has far two many Members of Parliament for her population? The Netherlands, with a larger population than that of Greece, has but one hundred and fifty in its Second Chamber.
To avoid major social disruption, I suggest that the EU/IMF puts its money where its mouth is, by insisting that parliamentary salaries are slashed by seventy per cent, to reflect economic reality, and that each member is restricted to one adviser/researcher. That might get the ball rolling in the right direction, by initiating a cathartic and catalytic effect in the interests of the country as a whole, rather than allowing the fat cats to continue squeezing the lemon until the pips squeak, and even destroying it.
Finally, but most importantly, the fact that members of parliament and ministers are protected from criminal behaviour by immunity is clearly completely undemocratic, and panders to the lowest common denominator of human behaviour. I wonder how many billions of Euros of ‘parliamentarians’ illegal money is deposited in the banks of the world’s launderette, the Swiss Confederation? Without lifting parliamentary and ministerial immunity, there is little point in even thinking of how to solve Greece’s problems.
Dr. William Mallinson
1 December 2011
Instead of destroying the livelihoods of countless hardworking Greeks through arbitrary reductions in salaries and Ottoman-type tax increases, is it not time that the neo-Ottoman clientelistic cleptocracy in the Greek Parliament put their own house in order, by setting an example? Is it not time to scrutinise those responsible for leading Greece to doom, the three hundred members of parliament and their dragoons of overpaid assistants and ‘advisers’, many of whom only have their jobs because they helped a candidate in an election? Are your readers aware that Greece, one of the EU’s poorest members, pays its Members of Parliament over twice what a British member gets, and that, to add insult to injury, a Greek member pays very little tax? Are they aware that a British Member of Parliament earns about thrice that of a young policeman, while in Greece, they earn about ten times that of a young Greek policeman? Are they aware that Greece has far two many Members of Parliament for her population? The Netherlands, with a larger population than that of Greece, has but one hundred and fifty in its Second Chamber.
To avoid major social disruption, I suggest that the EU/IMF puts its money where its mouth is, by insisting that parliamentary salaries are slashed by seventy per cent, to reflect economic reality, and that each member is restricted to one adviser/researcher. That might get the ball rolling in the right direction, by initiating a cathartic and catalytic effect in the interests of the country as a whole, rather than allowing the fat cats to continue squeezing the lemon until the pips squeak, and even destroying it.
Finally, but most importantly, the fact that members of parliament and ministers are protected from criminal behaviour by immunity is clearly completely undemocratic, and panders to the lowest common denominator of human behaviour. I wonder how many billions of Euros of ‘parliamentarians’ illegal money is deposited in the banks of the world’s launderette, the Swiss Confederation? Without lifting parliamentary and ministerial immunity, there is little point in even thinking of how to solve Greece’s problems.
Dr. William Mallinson
1 December 2011
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