FACT KILLS FICTION

FACT KILLS FICTION

The truth is still trying to catch up with the lies.

1970:   It is tiresome that the Turkish Cypriots are behaving in this aggressive and pettifogging way (Their obsession with percentages is perhaps illuminating in connection with the causes of the breakdown in intercommunal negotiations 1960-1963!).

 1970:  Although our right to the Base Areas does not legally derive from the Treaty of Establishment and our retention of them is not legally dependent on the consent of the Cyprus Government, it would in practice be difficult for us to retain them should the Cyprus Government choose to promote an active campaign for their removal[.....]If the Cyprus Government took steps to impede our use of the Base Areas, retaliatory measures would in theory be available to us. But we must recognise that the geographical position of the bases makes them hostage to Cypriot goodwill, and that in any such exchange, we would be the losers.

 1971: Finally, we have given careful thought to your suggestion that we might need to intervene physically to bar a Turkish intervention, if we were not to lose out to the Russians in Cyprus. I am afraid that this idea is just not on.

1971:  While the situation is not at this moment getting worse, the potential for evil increases the longer the communities remain apart.

1971(Re partition/double enosis):  [...] since the occupying powers would be our NATO allies, the Sovereign Base Areas would not be affected, although their legal basis might be shaken by the destruction of the 1960 complex of treaties.[...] Thinking Cypriots, of which there are some[!!!] are beginning to recognise that the only framework within which the problem can be solved is a European one.[...] If the Turkish General staff learnt anything from 1967, it must be that they should invade Cyprus while the going is good, without waiting for the international diplomatic machine to get into gear. I can see only one answer that would at least stand a chance of preserving our interests in Cyprus: to provide for a limited period a joint Anglo-American screen between Turkey and Cyprus .The object would be to gain time to allow saner counsels to prevail in Turkey,[...].

1974(22 July):  Our military bases on the island have usually been more of a liability than an asset.[....] If the complete removal of the Turkish community from Cyprus has to be ruled out as impracticable( as the example of the Palestinians suggests may be the case)then at least a de facto and temporary partition of the island into clearly defined Greek and Turkish areas seems essential.

1974(26 July):  When they achieve their objectives, they[the Turks] will be ready to talk.

1974(12 August):  [....] Kissinger had suggested  that he [Mavros] delayed [his visit to Washington] until this round of talks at Geneva was over [!!!].

1974(28 August):  His[Kissinger's] attitude towards the Greek Government seems to me to contain a personal element[...].

1974(16 November):  I gathered from Kissinger that he does not have much hope of putting off Makarios' return to Cyprus[...].He [Kissinger] was uncomplimentary about Makarios, whom he had seen a few days ago.

 William Mallinson

1 December 2008